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Abstract
Now that technology allows us to present photorealistic animations of scenically lit objects acting in real-
time, the problem of computer graphics has changed from making displays recognisable, to ensuring that
users notice what they are intended to see, without being distracted by irrelevant information. Worse than
that, the use of veridical displays that are intended to be lifelike runs the risk of introducing unpredictable
sources of information, that can lead users to infer all sorts of unwanted details. Traditional visual theory,
based upon bottom-up models of feature extraction from the retinal image, cannot inform us about these
aspects of perception. Broader based cognitive theories are required that integrate visual perception with
attention, memory, emotion and inference. Theories such as Barnard’s Interacting Cognitive Subsystems enable
phenomena such as change blindness and the craft principles of film editing to be interpreted within a common
framework, supporting extrapolation to computer graphics.
1. Introduction
Until comparatively recently, the major problem with
mass-market computer display technology was making
anything recognisable at all. Eighty character-width dis-
plays, with eight or nine brilliant green lines per char-
acter, slow to respond and slow to decay, somehow en-
abled people to use their vast new computers with their
kilobytes of memory. The pace of change should really
astonish us, as we contemplate flat, bright and crisp
LCD screens that require separate graphics processors
and megabytes of video memory chips just to display
our favourite desktop images. It now seems possible for
our technological artefacts to display almost anything
in as much detail as we would like, whether from a
high resolution photographic image or, via skilfully im-
plemented algorithms, by photorealistic rendering from
data. In the course of this rapid development, the major
problems have themselves changed: now we must ask
ourselves what it means for our displays to be recog-
nisable, and what is it in the display that needs to be
recognised?
There is a role for psychology in answering these
questions. The ultimate purpose of any computer dis-
play is for its content to be recognised by a human, and
visual perception has been a cornerstone of the disci-
pline since Wilhelm Wundt founded the first Laboratory
of Experimental Psychology over a hundred years ago.
The involvement of psychologists in human-computer
interaction, and specifically in computer graphics, is not
unheard of, of course. In the early days, choices of phos-
phor and of screen refresh times were driven not just by
technical and manufacturing constraints, but also by de-
tailed studies into phenomena such as critical flicker fu-
sion frequency and contrast sensitivity. The introduction
of colour within displays was (sometimes) backed up by
usability studies showing that (sometimes) it improved
performance. Compression algorithms were designed to
take into account the discriminability of different levels
of hue and saturation by the human visual system.
Contributions such as these have played an impor-
tant guiding role within the development of computer
graphics by providing principled and empirically justi-
fiable ground rules. If the human visual system cannot
see something, then you know there is no point display-
ing it like that. Now that the basic visual properties of
displays have been determined, we know how to make
displays that are readily perceivable and which are, to
all extents and purposes, capable of presenting veridical
scenes that are identical, in terms of their consequent
monocular retinal image, to a natural scene filmed with
a camera. If the perceptual processes that operate upon
the retinal image can work exactly as they do with ‘real
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life’ scenes, seeing something upon a computer screen is
now no more difficult than seeing it in any other rep-
resentational medium: so why should psychology still
have a role?
Psychology still has a role because it is about more
than low level constraints upon the visual system. It
is true that if you go into any psychology department
and ask to speak to an expert in vision, you will find
that they are concerned with detailed problems such as
the perception of optical flow, or of binocular disparity
in depth perception, or of texture discrimination. The
visual stimuli that participants in their psychophysical
experiments observe are dots, crosses, and lines of pure
colours, not photorealistic or veridical images. Their
research is, after all, still directed towards understanding
the way by which information gathered by the retina is
perceived at all. It is true that computer graphics has
gone beyond this stage. There are other psychologists,
though, who research later stages in perception, and it is
this work that should now be of interest to the computer
graphics community.
Does Computer Graphics need Psychology?
In providing a photorealistic image, the problem of mak-
ing something recognisable has been solved, or at least,
overcome. We are now faced with the problem of en-
suring that the viewer sees what we intend them to see,
rather than something else in the image. We have to
ensure that the image is not ambiguous, and that the
viewer will not interpret it as something other than we
intended, and that the image is not so rich in informa-
tion that the viewer is unsure about the relevant aspect.
We have to be sure that the veridicality of the image
does not lead the viewer to treat it as if the imaged scene
were really present, and to respond to some channel of
information that we have unwittingly introduced. These
are the problems that can be investigated by cognitive
psychologists, who are interested in the interplay of our
thoughts, ideas, memories, emotions and perceptions.
Consider the addition of a realistic face to an au-
dio signal that has been generated computationally, not
spoken by a real human. Wonderful techniques have
been developed for optimally rendering lip and face
movements so that the generated face speaks visually in
exactly the way a real person would, but the result is a
rather eerie appearance. The absence of emotional com-
ponents in the facial expression does not mean that we
fail to attribute any emotional content to the message.
Instead, we actively infer ‘absence of emotion’, which
is a very definite and undesirable emotional state. To
overcome this, cheek, eye and forehead components can
be manipulated to form a basic grammar of affect, and
these can be overlaid to add emotional tone: but now
we need to know what emotional tones are appropriate,
and how they interact with the emotional state of the
viewer. Is an interrogative raised eyebrow always per-
ceived as such, or does it appear condescending if the
viewer is unsure of themselves?
One study indicates that it is not simple to predict the
effects of introducing facial information into interfaces
[1]. Students were asked to complete an online ques-
tionnaire about a computerised tutorial package that
they had been using. A synthetic face was used to guide
the students through the questionnaire, with its mouth
movements synched to the text of the questions that
were spoken. Half of the students saw a face with a
‘neutral’ expression, and half saw a ‘stern’ face that had
a slight frown. Standard usability metrics indicated that
the stern face improved participants’ performance, in
that they took less time to complete the questionnaire,
and answered more of the questions. Designers would
be mistaken in inferring that all computerised avatars
should adopt a stern demeanour in order to enhance us-
ability, however. The actual content of the answers given
on the questionnaire revealed that the participants who
had been questioned by the stern face reported having
enjoyed the tutorial package less, had felt more stressed
by it, and had found it less usable, than had those who
had been questioned by the neutral face. The emotional
tone of the on-screen agent had migrated back into the
participants’ assessments of the previous, agentless (and
completely unemotional) interface; they were confusing
the tenor of their interaction with the stern-faced agent
with their assessment of the tutorial package: a classical
misattribution effect.
Nothing in a theory of visual perception that is based
entirely on the extraction and combination of features
from the physical image projected onto the retina can
account for such subtle emotional transfer effects. There
must be a link between the perceptual processes and
other, non-visual processes that identify aspects of the
world and use stored knowledge to add in inferred in-
formation, allowing us to construct an internal narrative
about the scenes that we observe. To design computer
interfaces that include realistic, multivariate represen-
tations, we must understand the operation and conse-
quences of such inferential processes.
Continuity, Cutting and Change Blindness
Another problem that has attracted a large amount of
research effort is that of the realistic rendering of mo-
tion through three dimensional space, and how to link it
in a usable and ‘natural’ fashion with user interface ac-
tions. It has been a long time since our ancestors swung
through the trees, after all, and while swooping through
abstract cyberspaces may become second nature to our
descendants, at the moment the best virtual environ-
ments still risk making people nauseous. Leaving aside
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the buzzword of ‘intuitive’, which often means no more
than ‘usable by other people in my lab’, it is worth step-
ping back and asking whether it really is in the interests
of the viewer to have every frame of their trip from A to
B animated in front of their very eyes. Especially if they
tend to close them to preserve their lunch. Is it worth us-
ing all those processor intensive routines to interpolate
and blur, when film directors find it just as convenient to
cut directly between camera positions? Pans and zooms
in cinematography are limited by extensive conventions,
that have been developed by a century of experience,
and so film should have something to say for computer
graphics.
The analogy between film editing and motion and
animation is most obvious, and has been addressed by
several researchers [2], but a broader argument can also
be made: cutting from camera to camera is akin to open-
ing windows on a display, since the ‘director’ changes
the scene in front of the viewer just as instantaneously
as the application does, but arguably with less disrup-
tive effect upon the viewer’s comprehension of the scene.
Most film cuts go unnoticed (an ordinary 90 minute film
can contain 1,500 cuts); most unnoticed new windows
are those that lead to interaction errors when the user
attempts to continue interacting with a different win-
dow. To understand how film cutting can help us create
a smoother interaction style in computer interfaces, we
need to do more than study the craft skills of cinematog-
raphy: we need psychology to understand why films are
easy to watch.
Our ability to perceive and comprehend film has long
been recognised as a challenge for theories of visual per-
ception. As early as 1916, Hugo Mu¨nsterberg compared
the close-up shot to perceptual attention; flashbacks to
acts of memory and mental imagery; and the sequencing
of shots to the sequential direction of attention around
a real-world visual scene [3]. Carroll [4] reports that an-
other early film theorist, Pudovkin, described the role of
the film editor as guiding the viewers’ attention to cer-
tain elements of the scene, the laws of editing therefore
being the same as those governing ‘ordinary looking’. He
and other analysts [5, 6] also discuss the use of close-up
shots to magnify critical details to the exclusion of the
surrounding scene, in the same way that a viewer in the
real world can concentrate upon one part of the scene
to the exclusion of the periphery of their gaze.
These early analyses of film concentrated on the re-
lationships between film perception and the attentional
capacities of the viewer, what might be thought of as
a ‘high level’ view of perception. Lower-level analyses
of film have also been informative. In his exhaustive
review of the differences between the images available
from filmed and real world scenes, Julian Hochberg [7]
pointed out that the optical apparatus intervening be-
tween the real world and film, and between the film and
the projected image, meant that many of the ‘invariances’
available in real world scenes were either distorted or
no longer invariant in film. That we can still visually
perceive objects and their relationships in film was, to
him, evidence against Gibsonian ideas of ‘direct per-
ception’ [e.g., 8], and in favour of the ‘traditional’ view
following Helmholtz. Gibson had argued that our per-
ceptual system has evolved and learnt to perceive certain
‘invariances’ or ‘affordances’ within the visual scene di-
rectly, without much processing or interpretation at all.
Thus the motion of dots fixed to the joints of a dancer
is readily seen as human, because they preserve some
invariant relationships about limb lengths and motions
[9]. The Helmholtzian view is that perception is an ex-
ploratory process in which visual sensory information
is evaluated against the viewer’s expectations about the
scene; a top-down, rather than a bottom-up process.
Hochberg’s paper had two main aims: a theoreti-
cal one, to contrast Helmholtzian and Gibsonian ideas
about perception by examining the empirical evidence
relating to the perception of dynamic visual scenes as
represented in film and the real world; and a practi-
cal one, to advocate the application of psychological
knowledge of perception to the then emerging technol-
ogy of computer graphics. His argument was that in the
absence of applicable psychological theory, film mak-
ers at least had the advantage of being able to point
their cameras at real world events, and so many of the
constraints upon object construction, appearance and
behaviour that our visual systems might make use of
were implicitly recorded in the resulting film, despite
the optical interventions he went on to detail. Computer
graphics, on the other hand, has no such constraints, and
its scenes can portray anything, behaving in any fash-
ion, at any level of veridicality, ranging from pixelated
monochromatic wire-frame sketches to high-resolution,
anti-aliased photographic renderings complete with mul-
tiple light sources, reflections, and receding surface tex-
tures.
While Hochberg’s theoretical argument against Gib-
sonian perception led him to concentrate on the differ-
ences in continual motion available in film and the real
world, he also pointed out the problems that film cut-
ting raised, and that to understand how viewers could
comprehend edited films:
‘we can no longer act as though the physics
of the pattern of stimulation and the action
of direction-sensitive cells and other pattern-
analyzing devices in the visual nervous system
will suffice to explain the phenomenon at hand
or predict the efficacy of the motion picture
sequence. Such concepts as schematic maps,
schematic events, and cognitive processing (and
c© The Eurographics Association and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000
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Figure 1: Change blindness can be induced by the ‘flicker paradigm’, in which two versions of a scene are shown in
alternation, each presentation lasting around 400 milliseconds, with a blank screen of between 40–80 milliseconds between
each presentation.
perhaps even a “linguistics of film”) become
necessary to any intelligent discussion of the
problem.’ [7, pp. 22–40]
Despite this assertion, there has been very little work
on such ‘high level’ problems in visual perception in
the years since Hochberg’s paper, while research at the
lower levels has proceeded apace. Perhaps because of
this, there has also been little interdisciplinary work
between psychologists and researchers and practitioners
in Computer Graphics, where the dominant mode is
the development of algorithms for rapidly rendering
veridical, film-like imagery from underlying models of
objects. While the research in this area is methodical and
exhaustive, little consideration is given to the processes
of perception, and psychological theories play no role in
directing research.
The recent interest in the phenomenon of ‘change
blindness’ illustrates the problem that follows from
a focus upon low-level physical perceptual processes.
Change blindness is a fascinating affront to our expec-
tation that we should easily be able to spot the ap-
pearance or disappearance of whole objects within our
field of view. The basic phenomenon is easily illustrated
with the ‘flicker paradigm’, in which original and mod-
ified versions of a scene are alternated every second or
so, with a 40–80 millisecond blank frame intervening
[10]. Observers cannot report the nature of the modifi-
cation without exhaustive serial inspection of the scene.
The change does not ‘draw attention’ to itself, contrary
to the expectations of those unfamiliar with the effect.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of a typical flicker paradigm
presentation.
The two scenes can alternate directly, without an in-
tervening blank frame, if small ‘mudsplashes’ (rectan-
gular areas of visual ‘noise’ patterns) are superimposed
on each image for 80 milliseconds following its onset
[11]. Change blindness occurs for dynamic scenes, as
well as for static pictures [12], with two-thirds of ob-
servers failing to report that the sole person in shot
across a cut between two camera positions was played
by two different, dissimilar actors [12]. Extending this to
real world experiences, people who were stopped by an
experimenter and asked for directions continued their
explanation without hesitation after two confederates
walked between them carrying a large door, despite the
fact that while the experimenter was occluded he had
been replaced by a confederate [13]. Clearly, a sound
understanding of change blindness would be useful for
interface designers, for it would allow them to predict
which changes to a display would be noticeable, and so
could serve as discrete alerts and pointers, and which
would not be noticeable, and so could be used to update
displays without distracting users from other, primary
tasks.
A recent review of ‘high level scene perception’ [14]
was restricted to the integration of views of a scene
over very brief eye movements (saccades) and the effect
of scene context upon object recognition. The startling
series of change blindness experiments were interpreted
solely in these terms. Levin & Simons [12], on the other
hand, have concluded that “Our intuition that we richly
represent the visual details of our environment is illu-
sory”, and O’Regan et al. [11] suggest that “We have the
impression of simultaneously seeing everything, because
any portion of the visual field that awakens our interest
is immediately available for scrutiny through an uncon-
scious flick of the eye or of attention”. According to
this view, the visual scene acts as an ‘external memory’,
and our internal representation is of a much less senso-
rial, object-based, and abstract nature. Such conclusions
have implications far beyond the processing of visual
c© The Eurographics Association and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000
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images over saccades, and pose a challenge for a body
of theory which is based upon the rapid extraction of
as much detail from the visual image as is possible. It
may be more profitable to interpret change blindness
effects as not being informative about low-level visual
processes at all, but rather showing the dominance upon
our perception of the high level cognitive processes. Our
phenomenological sensation of a rich visual percept is
not an illusion, but it is not the level of mental represen-
tation that we use to obtain information about object
properties and relationships, nor about their meaning.
In the rest of this paper I will describe a particular
cognitive level description of the perception of dynamic
scenes, which is based upon the idea that mental rep-
resentations exist at varying levels of abstraction, each
containing qualitatively different levels of information.
Our mental tasks are driven by the properties of one or
more of these levels of representation, depending upon
the nature of the task, and the suitability of the in-
formation that is available for the performance of the
task. It is not our purpose to deny that low level visual
processes exist, or that they are important in percep-
tion: clearly, without such processes, the higher levels
of mental representation would have no material to be
abstracted from. Like Hochberg, we do regard it as lim-
iting the application of perceptual psychology to focus
upon the physical levels to the exclusion of cognitive
levels of explanation.
Fragmentation of Knowledge and Unification of Theory
There are two real reasons why the practical knowl-
edge of cinematographers has been difficult to integrate
with computer graphics. First, the very pace of change
mitigates against the systematic application of interdis-
ciplinary knowledge. No-one can be expected to know
about all of the research that has been conducted out-
side their domain of expertise, and those who do know
about it cannot be expected to drop their own research
to keep an eye on your field, on the off-chance that they
will be able to help. Secondly, and more importantly,
it is very hard to map knowledge or principles from
one domain to another without some common theoret-
ical framework. Film makers express their craft skills
in terms of film-making situations that do not occur in
computer graphics. Psychologists who are researching
vision, or emotion, or spatial navigation, are doing so
with their own theoretical concepts, and it is no eas-
ier for them to map these onto a computer graphics
problem than it is for a computer graphics researcher
to understand the psychologists. The theories within a
domain are often too detailed and require too much
specific input to be applicable to problems outside their
native empirical paradigms. In fact, this is as much a
problem within psychology as it is between psychology
and other disciplines. Human behaviour has been parti-
tioned into so many areas, at so many levels of analysis,
that the mutual ignorance between researchers of vision,
memory and emotion is astounding.
Fortunately there is an ongoing effort to develop inte-
grative approaches within psychology that enable differ-
ent aspects of behaviour to be linked at a less detailed
level. Because they are not tied to any particular domain,
such approaches also provide a way to communicate
psychological research to non-psychologists, particularly
those working in applied domains. One such technique
that is becoming known within computer graphics is the
Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model (ICS) that has
been developed by Barnard and his colleagues [15]. The
model is simple, in that it breaks cognition down into
just nineteen ‘transformation processes’, between nine
‘subsystems’, each of which deals with a different level
of mental representation, each with its own memory, or
‘image record’. Although the model itself is simple, the
mental behaviour it allows is complex, since some of
these processes provide feedback, and there are some-
times two or more ‘routes’ between two subsystems.
One level of mental representation deals with ‘vision’
at a low level, where sensory attributes such as hue,
brightness and motion are represented; another with
the ‘objects’ that can be perceived within visually based
scenes; another with ‘propositions’, semantic facts about
objects and their relationships; and a fourth with ‘im-
plications’, the real meanings that can be inferred from
sets of propositions. Barnard’s approach is not limited
to this linear or bottom-up process of recognition and
comprehension, though. Implications feed back to influ-
ence the formation of propositions, and these feed back
to influence the formation of object representations. The
inclusion of internal feedback and top-down influences
within the cognitive flow is the key to ICS. A detailed
account is beyond the scope of this paper, and can be
found in recent reviews in the human-computer interac-
tion literature [16, 17]. The next few paragraphs attempt
to give a brief introduction to the model, to show how
it can help us understand the phenomena of film editing
and change blindness.
Visual Perception and Comprehension in ICS
The overall architecture is illustrated in Figure 2, with
the common generic structure of a subsystem shown in
the inset. Visual perception is mediated by four differ-
ent levels of representation, with the information flow
shown by the arrows linking four of the subsystems. The
visual subsystem uses its representations (richly sensorial
but lacking any object based information or spatial re-
lationships) to produce object representations (abstract,
spatially structured objects) and implicational represen-
tations (qualitative, holistic interpretations of stimuli,
such as their affective meaning). These are used by the
c© The Eurographics Association and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000
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Figure 2: The overall ICS architecture, with the routes for visual perception and comprehension indicated by the arrows
between subsystems, and the generic subsystem architecture (inset).
respective subsystems to produce propositional repre-
sentations (semantic, relational facts about the scene),
which can in turn be used by the propositional sub-
system to produce additional object and implicational
representations. Note that a subsystem does not pro-
duce its own named representation, but receives them
and turns them into other representations. At the same
time as these transformations are being carried out, each
subsystem copies the representations that it is receiving
to its own ‘image record’, and it is this copying to mem-
ory that gives rise to the phenomenological sense of
awareness of information. At each stage in the flow of
information, the transformation processes within a sub-
system may recruit this stored knowledge, derived from
previous experiences, to enrich the incoming informa-
tion.
The object level of representation can be thought of
as the ‘mind’s eye’, where our awareness of a visual
scene resides, but ICS includes a second route by which
visual information can affect cognition. The visual level
of representation is used to produce implicational mean-
ing directly, in addition to the interpretative object and
propositional route. A flashing red light, to take an ex-
treme example, has an implicational meaning that is
directly inferred from the sensory level. This meaning is,
paradoxically, available to influence in a top-down man-
ner the bottom-up structural interpretation. The same
is true for sensory attributes that might not even be
represented at the object level, such as aspects of facial
expression, or of co-variation in movement of scene ele-
ments. The impact of such features of a display can occur
despite our lack of awareness of their presence, and their
consequent unreportability. As such, it is clearly danger-
ous to rely upon introspection or self-report assessments
of display adequacy.
In this theory, visual representations correspond to
the features produced by pre-attentive stages of process-
ing. The object representations that the visual subsystem
produces combine with the ‘top-down’ flow of represen-
tations being output by the propositional subsystem,
to produce an integrated, object-based level of repre-
sentation, which corresponds to the perceiver’s internal
‘mental image’. The overall phenomenological experi-
ence of a rich, meaningful visual percept is based upon
information being copied to memory at several differ-
ent levels of representation. The most sensorial visual
level receives information only from the external world,
via the eyes and pre-cognitive visual processes, and so
c© The Eurographics Association and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000
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has only a very limited temporal persistence and is lim-
ited in its fidelity by the scope of the sensory apparatus.
The more abstract object level receives information both
from the externally-derived visual level and the internal
propositional level, and so can be maintained, or even
constructed, in the absence of sensory input, or when
sensory input is fragmentary, ambiguous, or flickering.
The propositional and implicational levels contribute to
semantic and holistic awareness of a scene.
At any particular moment, the quality of the phe-
nomenological experience depends upon the locus of
attention, which in Barnard’s model, is governed by the
competing demands of the various transformation pro-
cesses. Any process can access stored knowledge within
its subsystem, by revival of representations from an ‘im-
age record’. When the incoming stream is impoverished
to the extent that the transformation cannot produce its
output mapping continually, it can revive experiential
records that have only just been copied to the image
record, a mode of activity termed ‘buffered processing’.
This gives rise to the sensation of focal awareness, or
attention. Because of the consequences that buffered
processing has for the quality and rate of change of
information in the overall flow of information through
the whole cognitive system, only one process can be in
this mode at a time, and so only one representation can
be in focal awareness.
Within this conception of attention, the visual level
of representation would be present and so providing
a sense of diffuse awareness of the visual scene, even
when the focus of cognitive processing might be upon
the more abstract object or propositional levels. Change
blindness could then occur because a changing object
or feature might not be the focus of processing at the
appropriate cognitive level, even though the information
is available at another level, and the viewer is ‘aware’
of the object or of that area of the visual scene that
contains it.
Applying Cinematographic Principles to Interface
Design
May & Barnard [18] use ICS ideas to describe film edit-
ing techniques that are used to maintain the viewer’s
comprehension of a scene across cuts from one cam-
era viewpoint to another. These cuts can be labelled as
‘filmic’ if they adhere to ‘good practice’, in which case
they do not interrupt the viewer’s comprehension (and
are often not even noticed unless people are instructed
to detect them), or ‘unfilmic’ if they do not follow film-
maker’s craft experience and rules of thumb. Unfilmic
cuts are perceived as ‘jumps’ and distract viewers by forc-
ing them to attend to the structure of the visual scene
rather than the narrative, in order to reorient themselves
with relation to the objects and events that are being
portrayed. By analysing the techniques film-makers use,
we can reason about the psychological principles for
their success, and use these principles to transfer their
knowledge to other domains such as computer interface
design.
One of the techniques identified is the common one of
‘collocation’ or a ‘match cut’, in which the object within
the scene that the editor wants the viewer to attend to
following a cut is placed in the same visual position as
the object that they were likely to be watching imme-
diately before the cut. Thus a gunman might raise and
fire his gun, whereupon the scene cuts to the victim,
who is shown in the same screen position as the gun.
Collocation allows the cognitive processing that sup-
ports narrative comprehension to continue smoothly,
while an unfilmic cut would require a different mode of
processing to be briefly executed in order to scan the
screen to find an object that makes narrative sense. Most
cuts also represent a change in the point of view of the
person who is watching the scene, and filmic cuts tend
to be consistent with viewers’ experience of the percep-
tual world, such as simply turning their head from side
to side without physically changing position(although
the consequences for the visual image are not optically
identical [7]), or ‘zooming in on’ or ‘pulling back from’
a scene, which is analogous to changing their focus of
attention.
ICS represents the ‘narrative comprehension’ mode of
processing as one in which memory access and attention
is located within the two ‘central’ cognitive subsystems.
These process propositional and implicational represen-
tations of information, and the reciprocal processing be-
tween these two subsystems is the essential cognitive task
in watching a film. While the propositional information
about physical changes in the scene (derived from the
object structure of the visual information) is consistent
with the propositional information about the meaning
of the scene (derived from the implicational interpreta-
tion of the scene), the propositional subsystem can blend
and operate on its incoming representations without dif-
ficulty. Similarly, if any implications drawn directly from
the visual and acoustic information are coherent with
the implications drawn from the propositional repre-
sentation, the implicational subsystem can operate on a
coherent data stream. While both of these subsystems
are operating on coherent data streams, memory ac-
cess can be used to support the revival of records that
elaborate and explain the actions and events that are
portrayed, to anticipate the narrative, and to direct the
viewer’s attention around the scene. Changes in point
of view that are consistent with the viewer’s experience,
or which present consistent changes in the relative posi-
tions of objects within the scene, can be tolerated at this
level of processing and do not require cognitive work to
reorient the viewer with relation to the scene.
c© The Eurographics Association and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000
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Unfilmic cuts can disrupt this narrative comprehen-
sion mode by presenting structural information about
the visual scene that does not cohere with the ongoing
interpretation of the scene. Viewers will require mem-
ory access within the central subsystems to scan and
evaluate the new scene, to locate an object that does
fit with the interpretation, and even to assess the spatial
relationships between objects within the new scene to de-
termine how their own point of view has changed. Kraft
[19, 20] has shown that directing the viewers’ attention
towards detection of cuts impedes their comprehension
of a film’s narrative, as would be expected if the focus of
processing is shifting from the propositional and impli-
cational levels of representation to the object and visual
levels. Changes that are filmic pass undetected because
they are not incongruent with processing at the object,
propositional or implicational levels.
Although this explanation really requires a viewer
to be engaged in active comprehension of the scene in
order for unfilmic cuts to be distracting, a strong version
of the argument would be that even a comparatively
meaningless dynamic scene will show similar, if weaker,
effects of unfilmic and filmic cutting. As long as some
dynamic activity is occurring, the central subsystems will
be engaged in following the events and attempting to
predict future actions. Unfilmic cuts, such as those that
present a change in the visual structure of the scene
that is not consistent with the immediately prior visual
structure, should be more distracting to this activity, and
hence more ‘noticeable’, than filmic cuts, which might
go unnoticed, or take longer to report. The increased
detection within these experiments for jumps where the
direction of motion altered, in addition to the position
of the object, support this argument.
The same account can be applied to change blindness
studies, whether using the flicker paradigm, mudsplatter
patches, continuity errors in films, or real-world encoun-
ters. When the processing task is at a propositional or
implicational level, such as in giving a stranger direc-
tions, gross changes to the object level of representation
can pass by without impeding the flow of processing
and drawing the individual’s attention to the change.
Even when the task is to look for changes, changes to
the visual representation that are not part of the current
topic of processing at the object level will be difficult to
detect.
Conclusions and Future Directions
It is not necessary to conclude from change blindness
research that the phenomenology of a rich visual per-
cept is illusory, caused by the constant availability of the
external world for re-inspection. The distinction within
ICS between the visual, object and other levels of men-
tal representation accords each equal reality, with the
functional demands of an individual’s momentary task
determining which provides the quality of focal aware-
ness, otherwise known as attention.
This approach to cognition allows a new set of percep-
tual principles to be added to the low-level constraints
upon visibility of displays and the mysterious Gestalt
Laws of perception. These new principles govern the
requirement of congruency between the arrangement of
scene elements and the viewer’s expectations about the
scene; about changes within the scene and thematic tran-
sitions within the viewer’s comprehension of the ‘nar-
rative’; and about latent aspects of the interaction that
can influence the viewer’s interpretation of the scene.
The traffic is not all one way, of course. By providing
a framework for the modelling of cognition in complex
tasks, ICS may enable psychologists to develop empiri-
cal paradigms that do not rely on highly reduced stimuli.
The powerful graphics workstations in our laboratories
that currently display red and green dots for hours on
end may also be used to display photorealistic or ren-
dered images, without the psychologists muttering about
irrelevant complexity.
At the heart of ICS is its assertion that the meaning
of an image can have as important a contribution to its
perception as its physical structure. This is perhaps the
holy grail of graphical rendering: to convey meaning
as economically and accurately as is possible. Economy
resides on both sides of the interaction: in terms of
processing resources and hardware constraints on the
system side, and in terms of attention, cognitive effort,
and time on the user side. The solution will require
an understanding of meaning, of the representation of
meaning, and of the perception of meaning. The research
path that is opening up requires the computer graphics
community and cognitive psychologists to work together
in a truly meaningful way.
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